The Scientist Qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments

Philosophy of Science 20 (1):1-6 (1953)
  Copy   BIBTEX


The question of the relationship of the making of value judgments in a typically ethical sense to the methods and procedures of science has been discussed in the literature at least to that point which e. e. cummings somewhere refers to as “The Mystical Moment of Dullness.” Nevertheless, albeit with some trepidation, I feel that something more may fruitfully be said on the subject.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 86,273

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles


Added to PP

584 (#22,943)

6 months
21 (#90,993)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

The material theory of induction.John D. Norton - 2021 - Calgary, Alberta, Canada: University of Calgary Press.
Evidence, pragmatics, and justification.Jeremy Fantl & Matthew McGrath - 2002 - Philosophical Review 111 (1):67-94.
Inductive risk and values in science.Heather Douglas - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (4):559-579.
A Tale of Two Doctrines: Moral Encroachment and Doxastic Wronging.Rima Basu - 2021 - In Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 99-118.

View all 328 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

On Carnap’s Views on Ontology.Willard van Orman Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Studies 2 (5):65--72.

Add more references