Philosophy Research Archives 1460:535-559 (1982)
In an earlier essay I argued that perception involves an assentive propositional attitude. This essay completes the argument by examining the three most familiar propositional attitudes in order to determine which is best suited to perception. In Part I, I examine the contention of C.A. Campbell that perception involves judging, and I conclude that judging is too deliberative to be the assentive attitude in perception. On the other hand, in Part II, a study of David Armstrong’s and and George Pitcher’s claims that perception involves belief concludes that belief is too dispositional to be the assentive attitude in perception. Finally, in Part III, I examine Cook Wilson’s notion of being under an impression that, H.H. Price’s notion of taking for granted, and Roderick Chisholm’s notion of sensible taking, and I conclude that taking is the assentive attitude best suited to perception since it is both spontaneous and an act
|Keywords||Epistemology Perception Propositional Attitudes|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Propositional Attitudes.Reinhard Muskens - 1993 - In R. E. Asher & J. M. Y. Simpson (eds.), The Encyclopedia of Language and Linguistics. Pergamon Press.
Common Sense and Berkeley's Perception by Suggestion.Jody Graham - 1997 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 5 (3):397 – 423.
On Believing That I Am Thinking.Tom Stoneham - 1998 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 98 (2):125-44.
Against Essential Normativity of the Mental.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):263 - 283.
The Ontology of Perception: Bipolarity and Content.J. Dokic - 1998 - Erkenntnis 48 (2):153-69.
The Propositional Attitude in Perception.Ronald W. Ruegsegger - 1980 - Philosophy Research Archives 1408:1.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads8 ( #490,774 of 2,168,148 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #346,757 of 2,168,148 )
How can I increase my downloads?