Fregean propositions, belief preservation and cognitive value

Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):217-236 (2007)

Marco Ruffino
University of Campinas
In this paper I argue indirectly for Frege's semantics, in particular for his conception of propositions, by reviewing some difficulties faced by one of the main contemporary alternative approaches, i.e., the direct reference theory. While Frege's semantics can yield an explanation of cognitive value and belief-preservation, the alternative approach seems to run into trouble here. I shall also briefly consider the question of whether epistemic issues should be of any concern for semantics, i.e., whether the feature mentioned above should really be regarded as an advantage of Frege's theory.
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DOI 10.1163/9789401204026_010
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