The context principle and Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell's theory of types

Synthese 98 (3):401 - 414 (1994)
In this paper, I try to uncover the role played by Wittgenstein's context principle in his criticism of Russell's theory of types. There is evidence in Wittgenstein's writings that a syntactical version of the context principle in connection with the theory of symbolism functions as a good reason for his dispensing with the theory of types.
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DOI 10.1007/BF01063927
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The Foundations of Arithmetic.Gottlob Frege - 1953 - Evanston: Ill., Northwestern University Press.
Notebooks, 1914-1916.Ludwig Wittgenstein - 1969 - University of Chicago Press.

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