Why Frege would not be a neo-Fregean

Mind 112 (445):51-78 (2003)
In this paper, I seek to clarify an aspect of Frege's thought that has been only insufficiently explained in the literature, namely, his notion of logical objects. I adduce some elements of Frege's philosophy that elucidate why he saw extensions as natural candidates for paradigmatic cases of logical objects. Moreover, I argue (against the suggestion of some contemporary scholars, in particular, Wright and Boolos) that Frege could not have taken Hume's Principle instead of Axiom V as a fundamental law of arithmetic. This would be inconsistent with his views on logical objects. Finally, I shall argue that there is a connection between Frege's view on this topic and the famous thesis first formulated in ‘Über Begriff und Gegenstand’ that ‘the concept horse is not a concept’. As far as I know, no due attention has been given to this connection in the scholarly literature so far.
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DOI 10.1093/mind/112.445.51
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Frege's Context Principle: An Interpretation.Joongol Kim - 2011 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 92 (2):193-213.
The Breadth of the Paradox.Patricia Blanchette - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (1):30-49.

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