The Copernican Principle, Intelligent Extraterrestrials, and Arguments from Evil

Religious Studies 55:297-317 (2019)
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Abstract

The physicist Richard Gott defends the Copernican principle, which claims that when we have no information about our position along a given dimension among a group of observers, we should consider ourselves to be randomly located among those observers in respect to that dimension. First, I apply Copernican reasoning to the distribution of evil in the universe. I then contend that evidence for intelligent extraterrestrial life strengthens four important versions of the argument from evil. I remain neutral regarding whether this result is a reductio of these arguments from evil or the statement of a genuine evidential relationship.

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Author's Profile

Samuel Ruhmkorff
University of Michigan, Ann Arbor (PhD)

Citations of this work

Houston, Do We Have a Problem?C. A. McIntosh & Tyler Dalton McNabb - 2021 - Philosophia Christi 23 (1):101-124.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Survival and identity.David Lewis - 1976 - In Amélie Rorty (ed.), The Identities of Persons. University of California Press. pp. 17-40.
Death.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Noûs 4 (1):73-80.
Providence and the Problem of Evil.Richard Swinburne - 1998 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.

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