Mind 104 (416):827-862 (1995)

Ian Rumfitt
Oxford University
The paper addresses itself to the "Homeric struggle" in the theory of meaning between those (e.g., Grice) who try to analyze declarative meaning in terms of an intention to induce a belief and those (e.g., Davidson) for who declarative meaning consists in truth conditions. (The point of departure is Strawson's celebrated discussion of this issue, in his Inaugural Lecture.) I argue that neither style of analysis is satisfactory, and develop a "hybrid" that may be-although what I take from the Gricean side in the struggle is not the notion of an intention, but that of somebody's reason for speaking as he does. The paper applies the hybrid analysis to resolve certain problems connected with the rationale for compositional, truth-theoretic semantics
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DOI 10.1093/mind/104.416.827
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Assertion and its Constitutive Norms.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):98-130.
Idiolects.Richard Heck - 2006 - In Judith Jarvis Thomson & Alex Byrne (eds.), Content and Modality: Themes From the Philosophy of Robert Stalnaker. Oxford University Press.
Meaning and Truth-Conditions.Richard Heck - 2007 - In D. Greimann & G. Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language. Routledge. pp. 349--76.
Hornsby on the Phenomenology of Speech.Jennifer Hornsby & Jason Stanley - 2005 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 79 (1):131–145.
On Grice's Circle.Alessandro Capone - 2006 - Journal of Pragmatics 38:645-669.

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