On the scholastic or aristotelian roots of “intentionality” in Brentano

Topoi 8 (2):97-103 (1989)
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Abstract

The early Brentano identifies intentionality with intentional inexistence, i.e., with a kind of indwelling of the intentional object in the mind. The latter concept cannot be grasped apart from its scholastic background and the Aristotelian—Thomistic doctrine of the multiple use of being (to on legetai pollachos). The fact that Brentano abandoned the theory of the intentional inexistence in the course of time does not contradict the thesis that it is intentional inexistence and not the modern conception of reference or directedness to something other which comprises the essence of intentionality for the early Brentano.

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