On the scholastic or aristotelian roots of “intentionality” in Brentano

Topoi 8 (2):97-103 (1989)
Abstract
The early Brentano identifies intentionality with intentional inexistence, i.e., with a kind of indwelling of the intentional object in the mind. The latter concept cannot be grasped apart from its scholastic background and the Aristotelian—Thomistic doctrine of the multiple use of being (to on legetai pollachos). The fact that Brentano abandoned the theory of the intentional inexistence in the course of time does not contradict the thesis that it is intentional inexistence and not the modern conception of reference or directedness to something other which comprises the essence of intentionality for the early Brentano.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/BF00141364
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 30,169
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality.George Bealer - 1996 - In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press.
Are Only Mental Phenomena Intentional?Anders Nes - 2008 - Analysis 68 (3):205–215.
Chisholm on Brentano's Thesis.David H. Sanford - 1997 - In Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.), The Philosophy of Roderick M. Chisholm. Chicago: Open Court. pp. 25--201.
Die Einheit der Intentionalitätskonzeption Bei Brentano.Werner Sauer - 2006 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 73 (1):1-26.
Intensionality and Intentionality.Stephen F. Barker - 1982 - Philosophy Research Archives 8:95-109.
The Philosophy of Brentano.Linda L. McAlister (ed.) - 1976 - Humanities Press.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
111 ( #45,961 of 2,191,848 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #288,547 of 2,191,848 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature