Political Argument

Philosophical Quarterly 17 (66):87 (1967)

Abstract
Since its publication in 1965, Brian Barry's seminal work has occupied an important role in the revival of Anglo-American political philosophy. A number of ideas and terms in it have become part of the standard vocabulary, such as the distinction between "ideal-regarding" and "want-regarding" principles and the division of principles into aggregative and distributive. The book provided the first precise analysis of the concept of political values having trade-off relations and its analysis of the notion of the public interest has also been significant
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ISBN(s) 9780415595209  
DOI 10.2307/2218383
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Distinguishing Basic Needs and Fundamental Interests.Fabian Schuppert - 2013 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 16 (1):24-44.
Rawls’ Methodological Blueprint.Jonathan Floyd - 2017 - European Journal of Political Theory 16 (3):367-381.
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Does a Basic Needs Approach Need Capabilities?Soran Reader - 2006 - Journal of Political Philosophy 14 (3):337–350.

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