Paul Davidson and the Austrians: Reply to Davidson

Critical Review 7 (2-3):381-397 (1993)
Paul Davidson's critique of O'Driscoll and Rizzo is based on an ?official? philosophical position that turns on an opposition between knowledge and ignorance (in epistemology) and a corresponding opposition between ergodic and nonergodic processes (in ontology). But Davidson's substantive analysis reveals a very different ?unofficial? position, based on ?sensible expectations? and a realist ontology of enduring social structures. While O'Driscoll and Rizzo have the edge on Davidson in terms of their characterization of agents? beliefs, their ontology of event regularities is ultimately the same, and suffers from the same drawbacks, as Davidson's official ontology. The solution to some of these problems may lie in adopting an ontology similar to the one Davidson invokes in his unofficial capacity.
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DOI 10.1080/08913819308443306
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Karl R. Popper (1959). The Propensity Interpretation of Probability. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 10 (37):25-42.

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