The propositional structure of perception

Joseph Runzo

The propositional structure of perception

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American Philosophical Quarterly 14 (July):211-220 (1977)

Abstract	This article has no associated abstract. (fix it)
Keywords	Belief Epistemology Image Perception Picturing Proposition Representation Sensation Armstrong, D
Categories	Intentionalist Theories of Perception in Philosophy of Mind (categorize this paper)
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Is Perception a Source of Reasons?Santiago Echeverri - 2013 - Theoria 79 (1):22-56.

Sensory Experience and Intentionalism.Pierre Le Morvan - 2008 - Philosophy Compass 3 (4):685-702.

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