Causal theories of mental content

Philosophy Compass 3 (2):353–380 (2008)
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Abstract
Causal theories of mental content (CTs) ground certain aspects of a concept's meaning in the causal relations a concept bears to what it represents. Section 1 explains the problems CTs are meant to solve and introduces terminology commonly used to discuss these problems. Section 2 specifies criteria that any acceptable CT must satisfy. Sections 3, 4, and 5 critically survey various CTs, including those proposed by Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, Ruth Garrett Millikan, David Papineau, Dennis Stampe, Dan Ryder, and the author himself. The final section considers general objections to the causal approach
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2008.00130.x
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References found in this work BETA

Word and Object.W. V. Quine - 1960 - MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):515-532.
Representation and Mental Representation.Robert D. Rupert - 2018 - Philosophical Explorations 21 (2):204-225.
Psychosemantics and the Rich/Thin Debate1.E. J. Green - 2017 - Philosophical Perspectives 31 (1):153-186.

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