Philosophy Compass 3 (2):353–380 (2008)
Causal theories of mental content (CTs) ground certain aspects of a concept's meaning in the causal relations a concept bears to what it represents. Section 1 explains the problems CTs are meant to solve and introduces terminology commonly used to discuss these problems. Section 2 specifies criteria that any acceptable CT must satisfy. Sections 3, 4, and 5 critically survey various CTs, including those proposed by Fred Dretske, Jerry Fodor, Ruth Garrett Millikan, David Papineau, Dennis Stampe, Dan Ryder, and the author himself. The final section considers general objections to the causal approach
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References found in this work BETA
Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning in the Philosophy of Mind.Jerry A. Fodor - 1987 - MIT Press.
Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories.Ruth G. Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2009 - Philosophy Compass 4 (3):515-532.
Putting Unicepts to Work: A Teleosemantic Perspective on the Infant Mindreading Puzzle.John Michael - forthcoming - Synthese:1-24.
A Reconsideration of the Harsanyi–Sen–Weymark Debate on Utilitarianism.Greaves Hilary - forthcoming - Utilitas:1-39.
A Puzzle About Mental Self-Representation and Causation.Mikkel Gerken - 2014 - Philosophical Psychology 27 (6):890-906.
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