Is the World Really “Dappled”? A Response to Cartwright’s Charge against “Cross‐Wise Reduction”

Philosophy of Science 70 (1):57-67 (2003)
Abstract
Nancy Cartwright's charge against horizontal reductionism leads to a claim about how the world is, namely "dappled." By proposing a simple thought-experiment, I show that Cartwright's division of the world into "nomological" machines and "messy" systems for which no law applies is meaningless. The thought-experiment shows that for a system, having the property of being a nomological machine depends on what kind of questions you ask about it. No metaphysical conclusion about the world being unruly or not can be drawn from a division that is question-dependent. Moreover, I argue that this predicament undermines Cartwright's attempt to provide an illustration of how bad metaphysics of science translates into bad scientific methodologies and policies.
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DOI 10.1086/367869
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Why Metaphysical Abstinence Should Prevail in the Debate on Reductionism.Stéphanie Ruphy - 2005 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 19 (2):105 – 121.

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