Memory, Natural Kinds, and Cognitive Extension; or, Martians Don't Remember, and Cognitive Science Is Not about Cognition
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):25-47 (2013)
This paper evaluates the Natural-Kinds Argument for cognitive extension, which purports to show that the kinds presupposed by our best cognitive science have instances external to human organism. Various interpretations of the argument are articulated and evaluated, using the overarching categories of memory and cognition as test cases. Particular emphasis is placed on criteria for the scientific legitimacy of generic kinds, that is, kinds characterized in very broad terms rather than in terms of their fine-grained causal roles. Given the current state of cognitive science, I conclude that we have no reason to think memory or cognition are generic natural kinds that can ground an argument for cognitive extension
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Andy Clark (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action, and Cognitive Extension. Oxford University Press.
Mark Rowlands (2010). The New Science of the Mind: From Extended Mind to Embodied Phenomenology. Bradford.
Edouard Machery (2009). Doing Without Concepts. Oxford University Press.
John Sutton (2010). Exograms and Interdisciplinarity: History, the Extended Mind, and the Civilizing Process. In Richard Menary (ed.), The Extended Mind. MIT Press. pp. 189--225.
Citations of this work BETA
Kourken Michaelian (2014). JFGI: From Distributed Cognition to Distributed Reliabilism. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):314-346.
Mikkel Gerken (2014). Outsourced Cognition. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):127-158.
Ken Aizawa (forthcoming). Cognition and Behavior. Synthese:1-20.
Michael Wheeler (2015). Extended Consciousness: An Interim Report. Southern Journal of Philosophy 53:155-175.
Similar books and articles
Edouard Machery (2005). Concepts Are Not a Natural Kind. Philosophy of Science 72 (3):444-467.
Kourken Michaelian (2011). Is Memory a Natural Kind? Memory Studies 4 (2):170-189.
Georg Theiner (forthcoming). A Beginner’s Guide to Group Minds. In Jesper Kallestrup & Mark Sprevak (eds.), New Waves in Philosophy of Mind. Palgrave-Macmillan.
Richard Menary (2012). Cognitive Practices and Cognitive Character. Philosophical Explorations 15 (2):147 - 164.
Mog Stapleton (2013). Steps to a "Properly Embodied" Cognitive Science. Cognitive Systems Research 22 (June):1-11.
Rachel Cooper (2004). Why Hacking is Wrong About Human Kinds. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 55 (1):73-85.
Nick Bostrom & Toby Ord (2006). The Reversal Test: Eliminating Status Quo Bias in Applied Ethics. Ethics 116 (4):656-679.
Ron Sun (2004). Desiderata for Cognitive Architectures. Philosophical Psychology 17 (3):341-373.
Vincent Bergeron (2007). Anatomical and Functional Modularity in Cognitive Science: Shifting the Focus. Philosophical Psychology 20 (2):175 – 195.
Robert A. Wilson (2005). Collective Memory, Group Minds, and the Extended Mind Thesis. Cognitive Processing 6 (4).
Robert W. Clowes (2013). The Cognitive Integration of E-Memory. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):107-133.
Added to index2012-12-11
Total downloads391 ( #5,614 of 1,925,296 )
Recent downloads (6 months)36 ( #10,416 of 1,925,296 )
How can I increase my downloads?