Analysis 71 (4):719-733 (
2011)
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Abstract
I begin by considering various leadership aetiologies, wherein someone comes to obtain the various rights and obligations associated with the status function of a leader. Searle imagines two possibilities. First, someone comes to be a leader by way of established (e.g. democratic) constitutive rules or procedures. Second, someone might simply be declared a leader if they already wield sufficient coercive, non-deontological power. The deontological power associated with the status function of a leader is different from the antecedently existing coercive power in that the former works, not under the force of threat, but by way of the imposition of rights and obligations. I consider a third leadership aetiology based on charismatic power. The possibility of charismatic power, in turn, recommends a normative, aesthetic source that cannot be reduced to either deontological power or coercive power. I begin by looking, in Sections 1 and 2, at examples which gesture towards the plausibility of aesthetic norms as a constituent of some status functions. Using a largely Humean account of the aesthetic (Section 3) in Sections 4 and 5, I argue that aesthetic evaluations have the right formal properties to underlie a status function. In particular, they are suitably epistemically objective, and they can provide desire-independent reasons for action. Finally, in Section 6, I argue aesthetic norms that are necessarily unprincipled, decisively account for a class of status functions which resist articulation in terms of explicitly codified rights and obligations