Barriers to Implication

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In Charles Pigden (ed.), Hume on Is and Ought. Palgrave MacMillan (2010)
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Abstract

The formulation and proof of Hume’s Law and several related inference barrier theses.

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Gillian Russell
Australian Catholic University

Citations of this work

Remembering: Epistemic and Empirical.Carl F. Craver - 2020 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (2):261-281.
Truthmaking and the is—ought gap.Kit Fine - 2018 - Synthese 198 (2):887-914.
How to Prove Hume’s Law.Gillian Russell - 2021 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 51 (3):603-632.
Minding the Is-Ought Gap.Campbell Brown - 2014 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 43 (1):53-69.

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