Science & Education 22 (6):1389–1403 (2013)

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Abstract
In this article we focus on the concept of concept in conceptual change. We argue that (1) theories of higher learning must often employ two different notions of concept that should not be conflated: psychological and scientific concepts. The usages for these two notions are partly distinct and thus straightforward identification between them is unwarranted. Hence, the strong analogy between scientific theory change and individual learning should be approached with caution. In addition, we argue that (2) research in psychology and cognitive science provides a promising theoretical basis for developing explanatory mechanistic models of conceptual change. Moreover, we argue that (3) arguments against deeper integration between the fields of psychology and conceptual change are not convincing, and that recent theoretical developments in the cognitive sciences might prove indispensable in filling in the details in mechanisms of conceptual change.
Keywords Science learning  mechanism  conceptual change  , cognitive architecture
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Reprint years 2013
DOI 10.1007/s11191-012-9489-x
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References found in this work BETA

Thinking About Mechanisms.Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden & Carl F. Craver - 2000 - Philosophy of Science 67 (1):1-25.
When Mechanistic Models Explain.Carl F. Craver - 2006 - Synthese 153 (3):355-376.

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