Dispositional accounts of evil personhood

Philosophical Studies 149 (2):231 - 250 (2010)
Abstract
It is intuitively plausible that not every evildoer is an evil person. In order to make sense of this intuition we need to construct an account of evil personhood in addition to an account of evil action. Some philosophers have offered aggregative accounts of evil personhood, but these do not fit well with common intuitions about the explanatory power of evil personhood, the possibility of moral reform, and the relationship between evil and luck. In contrast, a dispositional account of evil personhood can allow that evil is explanatory, that an evil person can become good, and that luck might prevent evil persons from doing evil or cause non-evil persons to do evil. Yet the dispositional account of evil personhood implies that some evil persons are blameless, which seems to clash with the intuition that evil persons deserve our strongest moral condemnation. Moreover, since it is likely that a large proportion of us are disposed to perform evil actions in some environments, the dispositional account threatens to label a large proportion of people evil. In this paper I consider a range of possible modifications to the dispositional account that might bring it more closely into alignment with our intuitions about moral condemnation and the rarity of evil persons. According to the most plausible of these theories, S is an evil person if S is strongly disposed to perform evil actions when in conditions that favour S's autonomy
Keywords Evil  Vice  Moral character
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-009-9344-3
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References found in this work BETA
On Virtue Ethics.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1999 - Oxford University Press.
The Roots of Evil.John Kekes - 2005 - Cornell University Press.
Moral Unreason: The Case of Psychopathy.Heidi Lene Maibom - 2005 - Mind and Language 20 (2):237-57.
On Evil.Adam Morton - 2004 - Routledge.

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Citations of this work BETA
Evil, Monsters and Dualism.Luke Russell - 2010 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (1):45-58.
In Defense of the Mirror Thesis.Peter Brian Barry - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 155 (2):199-205.

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