Social Philosophy and Policy 27 (1):135-167 (2010)
AbstractMany libertarians believe that self-ownership is a separate matter from ownership of extra-personal property. “No-proviso” libertarians hold that property ownership should be free of any “fair share” constraints, on the grounds that the inability of the very poor to control property leaves their self-ownership intact. By contrast, left-libertarians hold that while no one need compensate others for owning himself, still property owners must compensate others for owning extra-personal property. What would a “self” have to be for these claims to be true? I argue that both of these camps must conceive of the boundaries of the self as including one's body but no part of the extra-personal world. However, other libertarians draw those boundaries differently, so that self-ownership cannot be separated from the right to control extra-personal property after all. In that case, property ownership must be subject to a fair share constraint, but that constraint does not require appropriators to pay compensation. This view, which I call “right libertarianism,” differs importantly from the other types primarily in its conception of the self, which I argue is independently more plausible.
Similar books and articles
Self-Ownership and the State: A Democratic Critique.Lea Ypi - 2011 - Ratio 24 (1):91-106.
Property, Persons, Boundaries: The Argument From Other-Ownership.Hugh Breakey - 2011 - Social Theory and Practice 37 (2):189-210.
A Dilemma for Libertarianism.Karl Widerquist - 2009 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 8 (1):43-72.
The Myth of Property: Toward an Egalitarian Theory of Ownership.John Christman (ed.) - 1994 - Oup Usa.
The Property of Share Holding System is the "Public Property": A Tentative Study on Marx-Engels' Theory of Share Holding System.Yan Zhang & Xin-an Wang - 2005 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 35 (4):50-54.
On the Value of the Intellectual Commons.James Wilson - 2012 - In New Frontiers in the Philosophy of Intellectual Property.
Self-Ownership.Peter Vallentyne - 2001 - In Laurence Becker & Charlotte Becker (eds.), Encyclopedia of Ethics, 2nd edition. Garland Publishing.
Intrinsic Limitations of Property Rights.J. M. Elegido - 1995 - Journal of Business Ethics 14 (5):411 - 416.
Qu'est-ce que la propriété? Une approche reinachienne.Olivier Massin - 2016 - Philosophie 128 (1):74-91.
Ownership and Justice: Volume 27, Part 1.Ellen Frankel Paul, Miller Jr & Jeffrey Paul (eds.) - 2010 - Cambridge University Press.
Children Apply Principles of Physical Ownership to Ideas.Alex Shaw, Vivian Li & Kristina R. Olson - 2012 - Cognitive Science 36 (8):1383-1403.
The Concept of Property in Rawls's Property-Owning Democracy.Tilo Wesche - 2013 - Analyse & Kritik 35 (1):99-111.
Self-Ownership and the Conflation Problem.David Sobel - forthcoming - In Mark Timmons (ed.), Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics.
The Self-Ownership Proviso: A New and Improved Lockean Proviso*: Eric Makc.Eric Mack - 1995 - Social Philosophy and Policy 12 (1):186-218.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Self-Ownership and the Importance of the Human Body.Ian Carter - 2019 - Social Philosophy and Policy 36 (2):94-115.
The Self-Ownership Proviso: A Critique.Peter Bornschein - 2018 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (4):339-355.
References found in this work
Phenomenology of Perception.Aron Gurwitsch, M. Merleau-Ponty & Colin Smith - 1964 - Philosophical Review 73 (3):417.
The Constitution of Selves.Christopher Williams & Marya Schechtman - 1998 - Philosophical Review 107 (4):641.
Virtue Theory and Abortion.Rosalind Hursthouse - 1991 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 20 (3):223-246.