Fodor, Adams, and causal properties

Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):57-61 (1993)
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Keywords Causality  Content  Mental States  Psychology  Science  Fodor, J
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DOI 10.1080/09515089308573077
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References found in this work BETA
A Modal Argument for Narrow Content.Jerry A. Fodor - 1991 - Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):5-26.

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Citations of this work BETA
Reply to Russow.Frederick Adams - 1993 - Philosophical Psychology 6 (1):63 – 65.

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Fodor's Vindication of Folk Psychology and the Charge of Epiphenomenalism.Nicholas P. Power - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21 (January):183-196.
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