New York, NY, USA: Oxford University Press (1995)

Authors
Paul Russell
Lund University
Abstract
In this book, Russell examines Hume's notion of free will and moral responsibility. It is widely held that Hume presents us with a classic statement of a compatibilist position--that freedom and responsibility can be reconciled with causation and, indeed, actually require it. Russell argues that this is a distortion of Hume's view, because it overlooks the crucial role of moral sentiment in Hume's picture of human nature. Hume was concerned to describe the regular mechanisms which generate moral sentiments such as responsibility, and Russell argues that his conception of free will must be interprted within this naturalistic framework. He goes on to discuss Hume's views about the nature and character of moral sentiment; the extent to which we have control over our moral character; and the justification of punishment. Throughout, Russell argues that the naturalistic avenue of interpretation of Hume's thought, far from draining it of its contemporary interest and significance, reveals it to be of great relevance to the ongoing contemporary debate.
Keywords Free will and determinism  Responsibility  David Hume  compatibilism  moral luck  punishment  naturalism  P.F. Strawson
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Reprint years 1996, 2002
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Call number B1499.E8.R87 1995
ISBN(s) 0195152905   9780195152906   9780195095012   0195095014
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Responsibility Naturalized: A Qualified Defence of Hume

This chapter provides a qualified defense of Hume's naturalistic approach to the problem of free will and moral responsibility. A particularly important theme is the contrast between Hume's naturalistic approach and the “rationalistic” approach associated with classical compatibilism. Wher... see more

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Compatibilism.Michael McKenna - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Tension in Critical Compatibilism.Robert H. Wallace - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 21 (1):321-332.
The Limits of Free Will: Replies to Bennett, Smith and Wallace. [REVIEW]Paul Russell - 2021 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 24 (1):357-373.

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