Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):742-761 (2018)

Authors
Devlin Russell
York University
Abstract
This paper constructs a theory according to which an intention is not a mental state but an action at a certain developmental stage. I model intention on organic life, and thus intention stands to action as tadpole stands to frog. I then argue for this theory by showing how it overcomes three problems: intending while merely preparing, not taking any steps, and the action is impossible. The problems vanish when we see that not all actions are mature. Just as some frogs are immature frogs, some actions are immature actions.
Keywords prospective intention  future-directed intention  pure intention  intending the impossible  acting for a reason  acting with an intention  rational teleology  practical reason  causal theory of reasons  naive action theory
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DOI 10.1080/00455091.2017.1414524
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References found in this work BETA

Intention, Plans, and Practical Reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
A Metaphysics for Freedom.Helen Steward - 2012 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons Without Rationalism.Kieran Setiya - 2007 - Princeton University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism.Philip Clark - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):308-327.
The Myth of a State of Intending.Devlin Russell - 2020 - Dialogue 59 (4):549-559.
Erratum.[author unknown] - 2018 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):762-762.

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