Intention as action under development: why intention is not a mental state

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 48 (5):742-761 (2018)
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Abstract

This paper constructs a theory according to which an intention is not a mental state but an action at a certain developmental stage. I model intention on organic life, and thus intention stands to action as tadpole stands to frog. I then argue for this theory by showing how it overcomes three problems: intending while merely preparing, not taking any steps, and the action is impossible. The problems vanish when we see that not all actions are mature. Just as some frogs are immature frogs, some actions are immature actions.

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Devlin Russell
York University

Citations of this work

Intention.Kieran Setiya - 2009 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Intentions, Intending, and Belief: Noninferential Weak Cognitivism.Philip Clark - 2020 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 101 (2):308-327.
Action.George Wilson - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
The Myth of a State of Intending.Devlin Russell - 2020 - Dialogue 59 (4):549-559.

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References found in this work

Intention, plans, and practical reason.Michael Bratman - 1987 - Cambridge: Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 57:321-332.
A Metaphysics for Freedom.Helen Steward - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.

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