Authors
Jon Williamson
University of Kent
Federica Russo
University of Amsterdam
Abstract
We argue that the health sciences make causal claims on the basis of evidence both of physical mechanisms, and of probabilistic dependencies. Consequently, an analysis of causality solely in terms of physical mechanisms or solely in terms of probabilistic relationships, does not do justice to the causal claims of these sciences. Yet there seems to be a single relation of cause in these sciences - pluralism about causality will not do either. Instead, we maintain, the health sciences require a theory of causality that unifies its mechanistic and probabilistic aspects. We argue that the epistemic theory of causality provides the required unification.
Keywords Causation   Probability
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DOI 10.1080/02698590701498084
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References found in this work BETA

Philosophical Papers Vol. II.David K. Lewis (ed.) - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Causality and Explanation.Wesley C. Salmon - 1997 - Oxford University Press.
Physical Causation.Phil Dowe - 2000 - Cambridge University Press.
A Probabilistic Theory of Causality.Patrick Suppes - 1968 - Amsterdam: North-Holland Pub. Co..
Physical Causation.Phil Dowe - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (1):244-248.

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Citations of this work BETA

The New Mechanical Philosophy.Stuart Glennan - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
Applying Evidential Pluralism to the Social Sciences.Yafeng Shan & Jon Williamson - 2021 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 11 (4):1-27.
Mechanisms: What Are They Evidence for in Evidence-Based Medicine?Holly Andersen - 2012 - Journal of Evaluation in Clinical Practice 18 (5):992-999.

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