Metaphysical analyticity and the epistemology of logic

Philosophical Studies 171 (1):161-175 (2014)
Abstract
Recent work on analyticity distinguishes two kinds, metaphysical and epistemic. This paper argues that the distinction allows for a new view in the philosophy of logic according to which the claims of logic are metaphysically analytic and have distinctive modal profiles, even though their epistemology is holist and in many ways rather Quinean. It is argued that such a view combines some of the more attractive aspects of the Carnapian and Quinean approaches to logic, whilst avoiding some famous problems
Keywords Epistemology of logic  Metaphysical analyticity  Truth in virtue of meaning  Two dogmas  Web of belief  Regress argument
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DOI 10.1007/s11098-013-0255-y
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Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.

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