Merleau-ponty and the myth of bodily intentionality

Noûs 22:35-47 (1988)
Abstract
I argue that, while merleau-ponty succeeds in justifying the claim that certain human intentional states essentially involve an embodied subject, one cannot justifiably assert the further claim that this sort of bodily intentionality involves a radically different account of what makes the state intentional. contrary to some currently popular interpretations, i argue that merleau-ponty's account of bodily intentionality requires the use of concepts and representations.
Keywords Metaphysics intention body representation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,511
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Harré and Merleau-Ponty: Beyond the Absent Moving Body in Embodied Social Theory.Charles R. Varela - 1994 - Journal for the Theory of Social Behaviour 24 (2):167–185.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Added to PP index
2009-07-07

Total downloads
0

Recent downloads (6 months)
0

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums