The Monist 67 (3):435-451 (1984)

Bruce Russell
Wayne State University
Gilbert Harman has recently distinguished three different kinds of moral relativism. One form of moral relativism Harman calls moral judgment relativism. It is the view that all “moral judgments contain an implicit reference to the speaker or some other person or group or certain moral standards, etc.” Harman never says what he means by “implicit reference,” but he does say that an ideal observer theorist who thinks “It would be wrong to do X” means the same as “If I were normal, impartial, and fully informed, I should feel obligated not to perform X” would be an example of a moral judgment relativist. He also says that an emotivist and an existentialist who holds that each person is subject only to the principles that person accepts are not moral judgment relativists.
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  General Interest  Philosophy of Mind  Philosophy of Science
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ISBN(s) 0026-9662
DOI 10.5840/monist198467324
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