Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 12:1-24 (1911)
The purpose of the following, paper is to consider whether there is a fundamenital division of the objects with which metaphysics is concerned into two classes, universals and particulars, or whetlher there is any method of overcoming this dualism. My own opinion is that the dualism is ultimate; on the other hand, many men with whom, in the main, I am in close agreement, hold that it is not ultimate. I do not feel the grounds in favour of its ultimate nature to be very conclusive, and in what follows I should lay stress rather on the distinctions and considerations introduced during the argument than on the conclusion at which the argument arrives
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Identity and Discernibility in Philosophy and Logic.James Ladyman, Øystein Linnebo & Richard Pettigrew - 2012 - Review of Symbolic Logic 5 (1):162-186.
What Constitutes the Numerical Diversity of Mathematical Objects?Fraser MacBride - 2006 - Analysis 66 (289):63–69.
Scientific Structuralism: On the Identity and Diversity of Objects in a Structure.James Ladyman - 2007 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 81 (1):23–43.
Similar books and articles
Proof of the Existence of Universals—and Roman Ingarden's Ontology.Ingvar Johansson - 2009 - Metaphysica 10 (1):65-87.
Nomic Universals and Particular Causal Relations: Which Are Basic and Which Are Derived?John Bolender - 2006 - Philosophia 34 (4):405-410.
Particulars, Universals and Russell's Late Ontology.Herbert Hochberg - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Research 21:129-137.
Universals and Particulars in a Phenomenalist Ontology.E. D. Klemke - 1960 - Philosophy of Science 27 (3):254-261.
Universals and Particulars: Readings in Ontology.Michael J. Loux (ed.) - 1970 - University of Notre Dame Press.
Russell on the Relations of Universals and Particulars.Larry Lee Blackman - 1983 - Philosophy Research Archives 9:265-278.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads654 ( #1,821 of 2,164,552 )
Recent downloads (6 months)17 ( #19,540 of 2,164,552 )
How can I increase my downloads?