Journal of Philosophical Logic 44 (6):793-803 (2015)

Authors
Gillian Russell
Australian Catholic University
Abstract
Take a correct sequent of formal logic, perhaps a simple logical truth, like the law of excluded middle, or something with premises, like disjunctive syllogism, but basically a claim of the form \.Γ can be empty. If you don’t like my examples, feel free to choose your own, everything I have to say should apply to those as well. Such a sequent attributes the properties of logical truth or logical consequence to a schematic sentence or argument. This paper aims to answer the question of how beliefs in such attributions are justified, on both its descriptive and normative interpretations; I aim to say when we generally take ourselves to be justified in forming such beliefs, and to make it plausible that beliefs formed this way really are justified.We can ask such questions about many domains but there are special difficulties for answering them in logic. Some of the difficulties stem from the fact that logic is thought t..
Keywords Logic  Epistemology  Analytic  Quine  Carnap  Kripke
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DOI 10.1007/s10992-015-9360-z
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References found in this work BETA

Two Dogmas of Empiricism.Willard V. O. Quine - 1951 - Philosophical Review 60 (1):20–43.
Language, Truth, and Logic.Alfred Jules Ayer - 1936 - London: V. Gollancz.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Philosophy of Logic.W. V. O. Quine - 1970 - Harvard University Press.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert H. Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

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Logical Partisanhood.Jack Woods - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (5):1203-1224.
Against Reflective Equilibrium for Logical Theorizing.Jack Woods - 2019 - Australasian Journal of Logic 16 (7):319.

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