The Myth of a State of Intending

Dialogue 59 (4):549-559 (2020)
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Abstract

RÉSUMÉDes travaux récents par Joseph Raz, Niko Kolodny et Sergio Tenenbaum suggèrent qu'il n'existe aucune contrainte normative propre aux intentions. De telles contraintes seraient un mythe. Selon eux, il est possible d'articuler la rationalité des intentions sans postuler que l'intention est un état mental. Je soutiens que nous pouvons aussi comprendre la nature descriptive des intentions sans postuler que l'intention est un état mental. Tout comme l'idée selon laquelle il y aurait des contraintes normatives propres aux intentions, ce postulat est aussi un mythe. L'intention est plutôt une action accompagnée de certaines sous-actions caractéristiques et jouant un rôle de coordination.

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Devlin Russell
York University

Citations of this work

What it takes to make a word.Wade Munroe - 2022 - Synthese 200 (4):1-30.

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References found in this work

The Myth of Instrumental Rationality.Joseph Raz - 2005 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 1 (1):28.
The Myth of Practical Consistency.Niko Kolodny - 2008 - European Journal of Philosophy 16 (3):366-402.

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