New York, NY: Oxford University Press (2013)

Authors
Oisín Deery
York University
Paul Russell
Lund University
Abstract
This collection provides a selection of the most essential contributions to the contemporary free will debate. Among the issues discussed and debated are skepticism and naturalism, alternate possibilities, the consequence argument, libertarian metaphysics, illusionism and revisionism, optimism and pessimism, neuroscience and free will, and experimental philosophy
Keywords free will  moral luck  compatibilism  determinism  optimism  skepticism  moral responsibility  punishment  causation and necessity
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ISBN(s) 9780199733392   0199733392   0199971625
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Arguments for Incompatibilism.Kadri Vihvelin - 2003/2017 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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