Authors
Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem
University of Pretoria
Abstract
In this article, against the background of a notion of ‘assembled’ truth, the evolutionary progressiveness of a theory is suggested as novel and promising explanation for the success of science. A new version of realism in science, referred to as ‘naturalised realism’ is outlined. Naturalised realism is ‘fallibilist’ in the unique sense that it captures and mimics the self-corrective core of scientific knowledge and its progress. It is argued that naturalised realism disarms Kyle Stanford’s anti-realist ‘new induction’ threats by showing that ‘explanationism’ and his ‘epistemic instrumentalism’ are just two positions among many on a constantly evolving continuum of options between instrumentalism and full-blown realism. In particular it is demonstrated that not only can naturalised realism redefine the terms of realist debate in such a way that no talk of miracles need enter the debate, but it also promises interesting defenses against inductive- and under-determination-based anti-realist arguments
Keywords Realism  Evolutionary progressiveness  Continuity  Reference  Truth  Unconceived alternatives
Categories (categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s10838-013-9220-x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - University of Chicago Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.

View all 92 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Repositioning Realism.Emma Ruttkamp-Bloem - 2015 - Philosophia Scientae 19:85-98.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Are Unconceived Alternatives a Problem for Scientific Realism?Michael Devitt - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (2):285-293.
Three Paradigms of Scientific Realism: A Truthmaking Account.Jamin Asay - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (1):1-21.
Inductions, Red Herrings, and the Best Explanation for the Mixed Record of Science.P. D. Magnus - 2010 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 61 (4):803-819.
Putnam, Realism and Truth.Janet Folina - 1995 - Synthese 103 (2):141--52.
Darwin's Pangenesis and the Problem of Unconceived Alternatives.P. Kyle Stanford - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (1):121-144.
The Scope and Multidimensionality of the Scientific Realism Debate.Howard Sankey & Dimitri Ginev - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (2):263-283.
Modest Realism.William Newton-Smith - 1988 - PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1988:179 - 189.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2013-05-03

Total views
232 ( #34,654 of 2,342,397 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
14 ( #44,459 of 2,342,397 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes