Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 4 (1):79-88 (2000)
AbstractI show that Susan Haack's foundherentist theory of justification accounts for the role of experience in the creation of justification. Experience causes one to be justified in believing by causing certain beliefs — the truth of which is necessary to one's being justified — to be true This is revealed when we notice that, as foundherentism holds, no belief is basic in the foundationalist sense, while all beliefs derive their justification from experience, contrary to coherentism.
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Is Science Like a Crossword Puzzle? Foundherentist Conceptions of Scientific Warrant.Rik Peels - 2016 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 46 (1):82-101.