The Foundherentist View of Justification by Experience

Principia: An International Journal of Epistemology 4 (1):79-88 (2000)
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I show that Susan Haack's foundherentist theory of justification accounts for the role of experience in the creation of justification (a role which has seemed mysterious since experience is not a proposition and therefore cannot, seemingly, support any propos/non). Experience causes one to be justified in believing by causing certain beliefs — the truth of which is necessary to one's being justified — to be true This is revealed when we notice that, as foundherentism holds, no belief is basic in the foundationalist sense, while all beliefs derive their justification from experience, contrary to coherentism.



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James Ryan
University of Miami (PhD)

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