Consequentialism, Threshold Retributivism, and Moral Intuitions

Criminal Law and Philosophy:1-12 (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The purpose of Adam Kolber’s magnificent book is to show that a consequentialist theory of punishment is superior to standard retributivism. In this comment I argue that Kolber is right when he rejects the claim that the traditional punishment of the innocent argument provides sufficient grounds for the rejection of consequentialism, but also that it may be the case that threshold retributivism is more attractive than consequentialism when it comes to intuitive fit. Furthermore, it is suggested that this possibility gives rise to a trilemma which Kolber will have to confront in order to ultimately establish the superiority of consequentialism over retributivism.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 107,286

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2025-04-11

Downloads
1 (#1,973,311)

6 months
1 (#1,659,081)

Historical graph of downloads

Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations