Moral intuitions and the expertise defence

Analysis 73 (1):3-9 (2013)

Abstract
Are the moral intuitions of philosophers more reliable than the intuitions of people who are not philosophically trained? According to what has become known as ‘the expertise defence’, the answer is in the affirmative. This answer has been sustained by drawing on analogies to expertise in other fields. However, in this article it is argued that the analogies presuppose two assumptions – the causal assumption and the quality assumption – which are not satisfied in relation to philosophical expertise. Thus, it is suggested that there are reasons to be sceptical with regard to the expertise defence
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DOI 10.1093/analys/ans135
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Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge.Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann - 2016 - Philosophical Studies 173 (10):2701-2726.
Analogies, Moral Intuitions, and the Expertise Defence.Regina A. Rini - 2014 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):169-181.

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