Analysis 74 (3):393-397 (2014)

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Abstract
That responsible moral agency presupposes certain mental capacities, constitutes a widely accepted view among theorists. Moreover, it is often assumed that degrees in the development of the relevant capacities co-vary with degrees of responsibility. In this article it is argued that, the move from the view that responsibility requires certain mental capacities to the position that degrees of responsibility co-vary with degrees of the development of the mental capacities, is premature
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DOI 10.1093/analys/anu039
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References found in this work BETA

Punishment and Responsibility.H. L. A. Hart - 1968 - Philosophy 45 (172):162-162.
A Plea for Monsters.Philippe Schlenker - 2002 - Linguistics and Philosophy 26 (1):29-120.
Monsters in Kaplan’s Logic of Demonstratives.Brian Rabern - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 164 (2):393-404.
Open Quotation.François Recanati - 2001 - Mind 110 (439):637-687.
Enhancing Responsibility.Nicole Vincent - 2013 - In N. Vincent (ed.), Neuroscience and Legal Responsibility. Oxford University Press. pp. 305-333.

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Being More Blameworthy.D. Justin Coates - 2019 - American Philosophical Quarterly 56 (3):233-246.

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