The autonomic nervous system and Dretske on phenomenal consciousness

Authors
Dan Ryder
University of British Columbia
Abstract
Title page Representational theories propose a set of sufficient conditions for a state to be phenomenally conscious. It turns out that insofar as these conditions have been worked out in detail, the autonomic nervous system (ANS) ought to be conscious - but of course it’s not. In this paper, we’ll describe only a tiny portion of the complexities of the ANS, using these to counterexample only a single theory of phenomenal consciousness, namely, Fred Dretske’s. But we think the ANS comparison strategy is a fruitful one in general, and we hope to convince you of this too
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