Dan Ryder
University of British Columbia
What makes a mental representation about what it's about? The majority view among naturalists seems to be that representation has something to do with causation, or information, or correlation, or some other related notion. But such "information-based" views (e.g. Fodor, Prinz, Stalnaker, Usher, Mandik, Tye, and lots of other people who gesture towards this kind of theory1) cannot accommodate representation of the distal
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Psychosemantics: The Problem of Meaning In the Philosophy of Mind.Jay L. Garfield - 1991 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (1):235-240.

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