Who's afraid of the big, bad wolf? Naturalizing empty concepts

Abstract
Externalist theories of representation (including most naturalistic psychosemantic theories) typically require some relation to obtain between a representation and what it represents. As a result, empty concepts cause problems for such theories. I offer a naturalistic and externalist account of empty concepts that shows how they can be shared across individuals. On this account, the brain is a general-purpose model-building machine, where items in the world serve as templates for model construction. Shareable empty concepts arise when there is a common template for different individuals' concepts, but where this template is not what the concept denotes
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history
Request removal from index
Translate to english
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 29,511
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Self‐Knowledge and Externalism About Empty Concepts.Ted Parent - 2015 - Analytic Philosophy 55 (3):158-168.
Boghossian on Empty Natural Kind Concepts.Tom Stoneham - 1999 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 99 (1):119-22.
First Order Logic with Empty Structures.Mohamed A. Amer - 1989 - Studia Logica 48 (2):169 - 177.
The Plurality of Concepts.Daniel A. Weiskopf - 2009 - Synthese 169 (1):145-173.
Concepts.Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Support for Individual Concepts.Barbara Abbott - 2011 - Linguistic and Philosophical Investigations 10:23-44.
Extensional Assumptions in Theories of Meaning and Concepts.Gregory L. Murphy - 1998 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 21 (1):80-81.
Concepts and Cognitive Science.Stephen Laurence & Eric Margolis - 1999 - In Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (eds.), Concepts: Core Readings. MIT Press. pp. 3-81.
Colors Without Circles?Kathrin Glüer - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):107--131.
Contributions to Syntax, Semantics, and the Philosophy of Science.Rolf Schock - 1964 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 5 (4):241--289.
Theory of Completeness for Logical Spaces.Kensaku Gomi - 2009 - Logica Universalis 3 (2):243-291.
Added to PP index
2011-06-23

Total downloads
55 ( #97,137 of 2,180,710 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #301,383 of 2,180,710 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature


Discussion
Order:
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.

Other forums