Philosophy 75 (3):331-344 (2000)
We falter and stammer when trying to describe our own mental acts. Many mental acts, including thinking, are what the author calls ‘chain-undertakings’, that is, courses of action with some over-arching purpose governing the moment-by-moment sub-acts of which we are introspectively aware. Hence the intermittency and sporadicness of the passage of mental activity which constitutes thinking about something.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Deciding as Intentional Action: Control Over Decisions.Joshua Shepherd - 2015 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 93 (2):335-351.
Similar books and articles
Quantum Fluctuations and the Action of the Mind.Jean E. Burns - 2002 - Noetic Journal 3 (4):312-317.
Extending Self-Consciousness Into the Future.John Barresi - 2001 - In C. Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum. pp. 141-161.
The Stream of Thoughts Versus Mental Acts.Richard W. Taylor - 1963 - Philosophical Quarterly 13 (October):311-321.
Consciousness in Act and Action.Keith Hossack - 2003 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 2 (3):187-203.
How (Not) to Think About Mental Action.Andrei A. Buckareff - 2005 - Philosophical Explorations 8 (1):83-89.
La Structure de l'Acte Intellectif Dans Les Théories Ockhamiennes du Concept.Ernesto Perini-Santos - 2007 - Vivarium 45 (1):93-112.
Mental Agency, Conscious Thinking, and Phenomenal Character.Matthew Soteriou - 2009 - In Lucy O'Brien & Matthew Soteriou (eds.), Mental Actions. Oxford University Press. pp. 231.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads93 ( #55,003 of 2,163,615 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #188,991 of 2,163,615 )
How can I increase my downloads?