Philosophical Studies 175 (10):2475-2506 (2018)

Authors
Bradford Saad
Rutgers University - New Brunswick
Abstract
Dualism holds that some mental events are fundamental and non-physical. I develop a prima facie plausible causal argument for dualism. The argument has several significant implications. First, it constitutes a new way of arguing for dualism. Second, it provides dualists with a parity response to causal arguments for physicalism. Third, it transforms the dialectical role of epiphenomenalism. Fourth, it refutes the view that causal considerations prima facie support physicalism but not dualism. After developing the causal argument for dualism and drawing out these implications, I subject the argument to a battery of objections. Some prompt revisions to the argument. Others reveal limitations in scope. It falls out of the discussion that the causal argument for dualism is best used against physicalism as a keystone in a divide and conquer strategy.
Keywords dualism  interactionism  physicalism  mental causation  causal overdetermination  causal closure  exclusion problem  fundamentality  grounding
Categories No categories specified
(categorize this paper)
ISBN(s)
DOI 10.1007/s11098-017-0969-3
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 64,132
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Writing the Book of the World.Theodore Sider - 2011 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
New Work for a Theory of Universals.David Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
No Work for a Theory of Grounding.Jessica M. Wilson - 2014 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 57 (5-6):535-579.

View all 82 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Causal closure of the physical, mental causation, and physics.Dejan R. Dimitrijević - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-22.
Causal Closure of the Physical, Mental Causation, and Physics.Dejan R. Dimitrijević - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-22.
Causal Closure of the Physical, Mental Causation, and Physics.Dejan R. Dimitrijević - 2020 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 10 (1):1-22.
Two Solutions to the Neural Discernment Problem.Bradford Saad - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 177 (10):2837-2850.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

An Argument Against Epiphenomenalism.Jason Megill - 2013 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 9 (2):5 - 17.
Causal Closure Principles and Emergentism.E. J. Lowe - 2000 - Philosophy 75 (294):571-586.
Explaining Causal Closure.Justin Tiehen - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2405-2425.
The Property Dualism Argument Against Physicalism.Andrew Botterell - 2003 - Journal of Philosophical Research 28:223-242.
Metaphysical Necessity Dualism.Ben White - 2018 - Synthese 195 (4):1779-1798.
Kim Against Dualism.David Jehle - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (3):565-78.
VIII—Defending Dualism.Sophie Gibb - 2015 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 115 (2pt2):131-146.
How Valuable Could a Material Object Be?Andrew M. Bailey & Joshua Rasmussen - 2016 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 2 (2):332-343.
Dualism and the Argument From Continuity.Eric Russert Kraemer & Charles Sayward - 1980 - Philosophical Studies 37 (January):55-59.
On A Wittgensteinian Objection to Kripke’s Dualism Argument.Richard Double - 1981 - Philosophy Research Archives 1414:171-181.
The Causal Exclusion Puzzle.David Pineda - 2002 - European Journal of Philosophy 10 (1):26-42.
Does the Exclusion Argument Put Any Pressure on Dualism?Daniel Stoljar & Christian List - 2017 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 95 (1):96-108.
Do Pains Make a Difference to Our Behavior?William S. Robinson - 1979 - American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (4):327-34.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2017-09-12

Total views
193 ( #55,206 of 2,454,729 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
26 ( #28,607 of 2,454,729 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes