Explanation and explanationism in science and metaphysics

In Matthew Slater & Zanja Yudell (eds.), Metaphysics and the Philosophy of Science: New Essays. Oxford University Press (forthcoming)
Authors
Juha Saatsi
University of Leeds
Abstract
This chapter examines the status of inference to the best explanation in naturalistic metaphysics. The methodology of inference to the best explanation in metaphysics is studied from the perspective of contemporary views on scientific explanation and explanatory inferences in the history and philosophy of science. This reveals serious shortcomings in prevalent attempts to vindicate metaphysical "explanationism" by reference to similarities between science and naturalistic metaphysics. This critique is brought out by considering a common gambit of methodological unity: (1) Both metaphysics and science employ inference to the best explanation. (2) One has no reason to think that if explanationism is truth-conducive in science, it is not so in metaphysics. (3) One has a positive reason to think that if explanationism is truth-conducive in science, it is also so in metaphysics.
Keywords inference to the best explanation  scientific realism  naturalistic metaphysics  unification  scientific explanation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2014
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Scientific Realism and the Stratagema de Divide Et Impera.Timothy D. Lyons - 2006 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (3):537-560.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Explanation in Metaphysics?Johannes Persson - 2011 - Metaphysica 12 (2):165-181.
Explanationism All the Way Down.Ronald J. Allen - 2008 - Episteme 5 (3):pp. 320-328.
Van Fraassen's Dutch Book Argument Against Explanationism.Dorit Ganson & Billy Holiday - 2007 - In J. K. Campbell, M. O'Rourke & H. S. Silverstein (eds.), Causation and Explanation. MIT Press. pp. 4--171.
Explanationist Plasticity and the Problem of the Criterion.Ted Poston - 2011 - Philosophical Papers 40 (3):395-419.
Modal Integration.Scott A. Shalkowski - 2012 - Philosophia Scientiae 16 (2):85-98.
Galileo, Rationality and Explanation.Joseph C. Pitt - 1988 - Philosophy of Science 55 (1):87-103.
The Metaphysics of Science: An Account of Modern Science in Terms of Principles, Laws and Theories.Nicholas Maxwell - 2009 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (2):228 – 232.
Explaining Modal Intuition.Nenad Miščević - 2003 - Acta Analytica 18 (1-2):5-41.
Skeptical Thoughts Concerning Explanationism and Skepticism.Clayton Littlejohn - 2014 - Symposion: Theoretical and Applied Inquiries in Philosophy and Social Sciences 1 (1):77-87.
Mechanisms Are Real and Local.Phyllis McKay Illari & Jon Williamson - 2011 - In Phyllis McKay Illari, Federica Russo & Jon Williamson (eds.), Causality in the Sciences. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2015-11-03

Total downloads
323 ( #13,119 of 2,294,062 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
120 ( #2,489 of 2,294,062 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature