Synthese:1-15 (2015)

Authors
Juha Saatsi
University of Leeds
Abstract
I review prominent historical arguments against scientific realism to indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions drawn from the historical evidence. The root of the overshooting can be located in some critical, undue presuppositions regarding realism. I will highlight these presuppositions in connection with both Laudan’s ‘Old induction’ and Stanford’s New induction, and then delineate a minimal realist view that does without the problematic presuppositions.
Keywords Realism  Pessimistic induction  Stanford
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Reprint years 2015
DOI 10.1007/s11229-015-0855-5
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References found in this work BETA

Meaning and the Moral Sciences.Hilary Putnam - 1978 - Routledge and Kegan Paul.
A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach.Jeffrey S. Poland - 1988 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):653-656.

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Citations of this work BETA

The History of Science as a Graveyard of Theories: A Philosophers’ Myth?Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):263-278.
Extensional Scientific Realism Vs. Intensional Scientific Realism.Seungbae Park - 2016 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 59:46-52.
Theoretical Fertility McMullin-Style.Samuel Schindler - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (1):151-173.

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