Historical inductions, Old and New
Synthese:1-15 (2015)
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| Abstract |
I review prominent historical arguments against scientific realism to indicate how they display a systematic overshooting in the conclusions drawn from the historical evidence. The root of the overshooting can be located in some critical, undue presuppositions regarding realism. I will highlight these presuppositions in connection with both Laudan’s ‘Old induction’ and Stanford’s New induction, and then delineate a minimal realist view that does without the problematic presuppositions.
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| Keywords | Realism Pessimistic induction Stanford |
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| Reprint years | 2015 |
| DOI | 10.1007/s11229-015-0855-5 |
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References found in this work BETA
Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach.Jeffrey S. Poland - 1988 - Philosophical Review 100 (4):653-656.
View all 36 references / Add more references
Citations of this work BETA
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Scientific Realism Meets Metaphysics of Quantum Mechanics.Juha Saatsi - 2017 - In Philosophers Think About Quantum Theory.
View all 8 citations / Add more citations
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2015-08-20
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