On the pessimistic induction and two fallacies

Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1088-1098 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The Pessimistic Induction from falsity of past theories forms a perennial argument against scientific realism. This paper considers and rebuts two recent arguments—due to Lewis (2001) and Lange (2002)—to the conclusion that the Pessimistic Induction (in its best known form) is fallacious. It re-establishes the dignity of the Pessimistic Induction by calling to mind the basic objective of the argument, and hence restores the propriety of the realist program of responding to PMI by undermining one or another of its premises.

Categories

Keywords

Reprint years

DOI

10.1086/508959

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 97,078

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

My notes

Similar books and articles

Global and Local Pessimistic Meta-inductions.Samuel Ruhmkorff - 2013 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 27 (4):409-428.
We Think, They Thought: A Critique of the Pessimistic Meta-Meta Induction.Fahrbach Ludwig - 2021 - In Timothy D. Lyons & Peter Vickers (eds.), Contemporary Scientific Realism: The Challenge From the History of Science. New York, NY: Oxford University Press. pp. 283-310.
The Pessimistic Induction: A Bad Argument Gone Too Far.Moti Mizrahi - 2013 - Synthese 190 (15):3209-3226.
The Anti-Induction for Scientific Realism.Seungbae Park - 2018 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 95 (3):329-342.
Why the pessimistic induction is a fallacy.Peter J. Lewis - 2001 - Synthese 129 (3):371--380.
We think, they thought : a critique of the pessimistic meta-meta induction.Ludwig Fahrbach - 2021 - In Timothy D. Lyons & Peter Vickers (eds.), Contemporary Scientific Realism: The Challenge From the History of Science. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
A Pessimistic Induction against Scientific Antirealism.Seungbae Park - 2014 - Organon F: Medzinárodný Časopis Pre Analytickú Filozofiu 21 (1):3-21.
Why Should We Be Pessimistic about Antirealists and Pessimists?Seungbae Park - 2017 - Foundations of Science 22 (3):613-625.
On Realism and the Pessimistic Meta-Induction.Howdyshell Stanford - unknown
The pessimistic induction and the exponential growth of science reassessed.K. Brad Wray - 2013 - Synthese 190 (18):4321-4330.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
414 (#57,796)

6 months
52 (#103,954)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Juha Saatsi
University of Leeds

Citations of this work

Scientific Realism.Anjan Chakravartty - 2011 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Scientific Realism.Richard Boyd - 1984 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 21 (1&2):767-791.
The History of Science as a Graveyard of Theories: A Philosophers’ Myth?Moti Mizrahi - 2016 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 30 (3):263-278.
Historical Inductions: New Cherries, Same Old Cherry-picking.Moti Mizrahi - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (2):129-148.

View all 28 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The Scientific Image.William Demopoulos & Bas C. van Fraassen - 1982 - Philosophical Review 91 (4):603.
A confutation of convergent realism.Larry Laudan - 1981 - Philosophy of Science 48 (1):19-49.
A Confutation of Convergent Realism.Larry Laudan - 2001 - In Yuri Balashov & Alexander Rosenberg (eds.), Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings. New York: Routledge. pp. 211.

View all 9 references / Add more references