On the pessimistic induction and two fallacies

Philosophy of Science 72 (5):1088-1098 (2004)
Authors
Juha Saatsi
University of Leeds
Abstract
The Pessimistic Induction from falsity of past theories forms a perennial argument against scientific realism. This paper considers and rebuts two recent arguments—due to Lewis (2001) and Lange (2002)—to the conclusion that the Pessimistic Induction (in its best known form) is fallacious. It re-establishes the dignity of the Pessimistic Induction by calling to mind the basic objective of the argument, and hence restores the propriety of the realist program of responding to PMI by undermining one or another of its premises.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2005
DOI 10.1086/508959
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,941
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Pessimistic Inductions: Four Varieties.K. Brad Wray - 2015 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 29 (1):61-73.
Assessing Climate Model Projections: State of the Art and Philosophical Reflections.Joel Katzav, Henk A. Dijkstra & A. T. J. de Laat - 2012 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 43 (4):258-276.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

A Confutation of the Pessimistic Induction.Seungbae Park - 2011 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 42 (1):75-84.
The Pessimistic Induction, the Flight to Reference and the Metaphysical Zoo.Michael A. Bishop - 2003 - International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (2):161 – 178.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
292 ( #15,159 of 2,293,866 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #87,949 of 2,293,866 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature