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The Enhanced Indispensability Argument: Representational versus Explanatory Role of Mathematics in Science
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 62 (1):143-154 (2011)
Abstract
The Enhanced Indispensability Argument (Baker [ 2009 ]) exemplifies the new wave of the indispensability argument for mathematical Platonism. The new wave capitalizes on mathematics' role in scientific explanations. I will criticize some analyses of mathematics' explanatory function. In turn, I will emphasize the representational role of mathematics, and argue that the debate would significantly benefit from acknowledging this alternative viewpoint to mathematics' contribution to scientific explanations and knowledge.Author's Profile
DOI
10.1093/bjps/axq029
My notes
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Citations of this work
Explanatory Abstractions.Lina Jansson & Juha Saatsi - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):817–844.
On the ‘Indispensable Explanatory Role’ of Mathematics.Juha Saatsi - 2016 - Mind 125 (500):1045-1070.
Explanation in Computational Neuroscience: Causal and Non-causal.M. Chirimuuta - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (3):849-880.
Mathematical Explanation by Law.Sam Baron - 2019 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 70 (3):683-717.
References found in this work
Are there genuine mathematical explanations of physical phenomena?Alan Baker - 2005 - Mind 114 (454):223-238.
Mathematical Explanation in Science.Alan Baker - 2009 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (3):611-633.
The explanatory power of phase spaces.Aidan Lyon & Mark Colyvan - 2008 - Philosophia Mathematica 16 (2):227-243.
Explanation in Mathematics.Paolo Mancosu - 2011 - In Edward N. Zalta (ed.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
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