Another Argument for Cognitive Phenomenology

Alberto Voltolini
Università degli Studi di Torino
__: In this paper, we want to support Kriegel’s argument in favor of the thesis that there is a cognitive form of phenomenology that is both irreducible to and independent of any sensory form of phenomenology by providing another argument in favor of the same thesis. Indeed, this new argument is also intended to show that the thought experiment Kriegel’s argument relies on does describe a genuine metaphysical possibility. In our view, Kriegel has not entirely succeeded in showing that his own argument displays that possibility. We present our argument in two steps. First, we attempt to prove that there is a cognitive phenomenology that is irreducible to any form of sensory phenomenology. Our proof relies on a kind of phenomenal contrast argument that however does not appeal to introspection. Second, by showing that the link between this form of cognitive phenomenology, the phenomenology of having thoughts, and sensory phenomenology in general is extrinsic, we also aim to demonstrate that the former is independent of the latter. _Keywords_: Cognitive Phenomenology; Irreduciblity; Independence; Having Thoughts; Grasping Thoughts _Un altro argomento in favore della fenomenologia cognitiva_ _Riassunto_: In questo articolo intendiamo corroborare l’argomento di Kriegel in favore dell’esistenza di una forma cognitiva di fenomenologia irriducibile a e indipendente da ogni altra forma di fenomenologia della sensibilità, avanzando un altro argomento a sostegno della stessa tesi. Nei fatti, questo nuovo argomento vuole anche mostrare che l’esperimento mentale su cui poggia l’argomento di Kriegel descrive effettivamente una genuina possibilità metafisica; e tuttavia crediamo che l’argomento di Kriegel non abbia mostrato fino in fondo proprio questa possibilità. Vogliamo presentare il nostro argomento in due passi. In un primo momento, tenteremo di provare l’esistenza di una fenomenologia cognitiva irriducibile a ogni altra forma di fenomenologia sensoriale. La nostra prova poggia su un tipo di argomento basato su un contrasto fenomenico che non si appella all’introspezione. In un secondo momento, mostrando che il legame tra questa forma di fenomenologia cognitiva, ossia la fenomenologia del possesso dei pensieri, e la fenomenologia sensoriale è un legame estrinseco, intendiamo dimostrare che la prima è indipendente dalla seconda. _Parole chiave_: Fenomenologia cognitiva; Irriduciblità; Indipendenza; Possesso dei pensieri; Afferramento dei pensieri
Keywords Irreduciblity  Independence  Grasping Thoughts  Cognitive Phenomenology  Having Thoughts
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DOI 10.4453/rifp.2016.0025
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