Philosophical Writings 41 (1):32-46 (2013)
AbstractIn this paper I seek defend the view that fictional characters are author-created abstract entities against objections offered by Stuart Brock in his paper “The Creationist Fiction: The Case against Creationism about Fictional Characters.” I argue that his objections fall far short of his goal of showing that if philosophers want to believe in fictional characters as abstract objects, they should not view them as author-created. My defense of creationism in fiction in part rests on tying the act of creating a fictional character more closely to the act of story-telling. Ultimately I aim to show that the creation of abstract entities is not as problem-laden as some may think, and that such a view is coherent.
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References found in this work
The Logical Status of Fictional Discourse.John R. Searle - 1975 - New Literary History 6 (2):319--32.