Direct Moral Grounding and the Legal Model of Moral Normativity

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 18 (4):703-716 (2015)

Abstract
Whereas most moral philosophers believe that the facts as to what we’re morally required to do are grounded by the facts about our moral reasons, which in turn are grounded by non-normative facts, I propose that moral requirements are directly grounded by non-normative facts. This isn’t, however, to say that there is no place in the picture for moral reasons. Moral reasons exist, and they’re grounded by moral requirements. Arguing for this picture of the moral sphere requires playing both offense and defense; this article provides the defense. I defend this view against the objections that it must deny that one is generally blameworthy for having violated a moral requirement, that it implies the existence of genuine moral dilemmas, that it runs counter to an obviously true view of how moral deliberation should work, and that it cannot explain why it feels as though figuring about what one is morally required to do often takes the form of thinking about what one’s moral reasons are.
Keywords Moral reasons  Moral requirements  Grounding  Blameworthiness  Moral deliberation  Reasons-first
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Reprint years 2016
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DOI 10.1007/s10677-015-9598-0
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References found in this work BETA

Ethics Without Principles.Jonathan Dancy - 2004 - Oxford University Press.
Being Realistic About Reasons.T. M. Scanlon - 2014 - Oxford University Press.
The View From Nowhere.Thomas Nagel - 1986 - Oxford University Press.
Slaves of the Passions.Mark Schroeder - 2007 - Oxford University Press.

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