In José Luis Bermúdez (ed.), Thought, Reference, and Experience: Themes From the Philosophy of Gareth Evans. Clarendon Press (2005)
It seems that when the term "coreference" is used, whether in linguistics or in philosophy, there is often presumed to be a consensus about what it is, or at least about what it is in the context where the term is introduced. I don't think the term deserves to have much use at all, insofar as it disguises more interesting linguistic and pragmatic relations between nominal forms in natural language. My preoccupation with these relations issues in part from some of the central concerns and distinctions introduced in Evans (1980), an essay that has had wide and, in some cases, a very deep influence on how a variety of reference issues have been addressed in modern linguistics. As a linguist, my interest is in the way in which natural language shapes what we know and from that perspective, I want to understand how natural language sets boundary conditions on how linguistic forms can be used to achieve readings that pick out the same entity more than once.
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