From Instructional Social Computer Simulation to Heidegger's Aesthetics
Dissertation, Indiana University (
2000)
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Abstract
Using Schon's conception of reflection-in-action as an organizing structure, the author examines instructional social computer simulation by designing and reflecting upon computer prototypes and linking this analysis to appropriate literature. ;The author begins his study by examining the theoretical antecedents of model and location simulations. However, eventually agreeing with Dilthey's critique that society cannot be represented via scientific, law-like generalizations, he decides that model/location simulation reflects the "standard view of science" approach to the representation of society. ;Drawing from the interpretivist tradition, the author continues his investigation by creating a computer prototype based on an different framework. Rather than using mathematical models as a foundation, this prototype uses "semantically dense" imagery and texts to represent culture. This aesthetic mode of representation enables viewers to generate a number of different interpretations of the subject matter. ;The author seeks to further refine this prototype using 3D technology. However, drawing from Merleau-Ponty's work, he decides that 3D is an inauthentic mode of representation because it assumes that vision is a primarily a "physical-optical" engagement in which the world "stands before" a viewer. The author eventually adopts Heidegger's ontological understanding of art not as representation, but as unconcealment. ;Thus, the author concludes that instructional social computer simulation can be viewed in three ways. The model simulation is a product of a scientific worldview that embodies the Cartesian desire to "make ourselves masters and possessors of nature." The subjective representation discloses the world as the creation of an artist emphasizing the imaginative and creative power of the individual. An ontological position abandons simulation. In order to discriminate between the ontic and the ontological, the author describes two features of the ontological---anxiety and waiting---linking these features to Heidegger's work on anxiety and Bestand