I—R. M. Sainsbury and Michael Tye: An Originalist Theory of Concepts

Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 85 (1):101-124 (2011)
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Abstract

We argue that thoughts are structures of concepts, and that concepts should be individuated by their origins, rather than in terms of their semantic or epistemic properties. Many features of cognition turn on the vehicles of content, thoughts, rather than on the nature of the contents they express. Originalism makes concepts available to explain, with no threat of circularity, puzzling cases concerning thought. In this paper, we mention Hesperus/Phosphorus puzzles, the Evans-Perry example of the ship seen through different windows, and Mates cases, and we believe that there are many additional applications

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Author Profiles

Mark Sainsbury
University of Texas at Austin

Citations of this work

Mental Files.François Récanati - 2012 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Private Investigators and Public Speakers.Alexander Sandgren - 2023 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 9 (1):95-113.
Varieties of conceptual analysis.Max Kölbel - 2021 - Analytic Philosophy 64 (1):20-38.
‘True’ as Polysemous.Andy Yu - 2021 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 102 (4):542-569.

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References found in this work

Naming and Necessity: Lectures Given to the Princeton University Philosophy Colloquium.Saul A. Kripke - 1980 - Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Edited by Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel.
The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press. Edited by John Henry McDowell.
Individualism and the mental.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4 (1):73-122.
Naming and necessity.Saul Kripke - 2010 - In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Arguing about language. New York: Routledge. pp. 431-433.
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1980 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.

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